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IV
ADDRESS

By Philip B. Kurland
William R Kenan, Jr.,
DistinguishedService Professor,
the University of Chicago

The Wednesday luncheon session
honoring new life members
and members elected
within the previous five years
convened in the East and State Rooms
of The Mayflower, Washington, D C,
on May 14, 1986,
and was called to order at 12 45 p m by
President Roswell B Perkins
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PRESIDENT ROSWELL B. PERKINS: The spokesman for
the cls of J961 is Professor Philip Kurland of the University
of Chicago. Phil is a bona fide real Brooklyner. He was born
there in 1921 and broughi up there and cheered for the Dodgers as loudly as anyone else. In fact, he tells me that he has
departed from the baseball scene ever since he lost the Dodgers. That was a sad event in the lives of many people, we're
sorry it happened to you, Phil.
He went to the University of Pennsylvania, got his A.B.
in 1942, and then went year ,round at the Harvard Law
School during the war years and was President of the Harvard
Law Review and graduated in 1944. After graduation he
clerked in the Second Circuit for Judge Jerome Frank; this
was followed by a year of clerking for Felix Frankfurter, ending up in 1946 with a brief stop at the Justice Department,
where he worked on a very famous mine workers' injunctiel
case. He then went back to New York and formed a small law
firm, Kurland and Wolfson, and after three years of practice
was enticed by Northwestern Law School to come out and go
on the faculty, which he did.
He was there three years and then went to the University
of Chicago on the faculty of the law school, became a full
Professor two years later, and so since 1953 he's been in Chicago, since 1956 in the capacity of full Professor.
Over the years Phil has had many posts of honor. One
that he recalls with great joy was working as a consultant on
the subcommittee on separation of powers on the U. S. Judiciary Committee under the chairmanship of Sam Ervin.
In 1960 he conceived of and created a publication, with
which I'm sure many of you are familiar, namely, the Supreme Court Review, consisting of a collection of commentaries on the work of t1 e court published by the University of
Chicago, edited by him. He now shares the editi xg with our
Council member Dean Casper and Dennis Huchinson, and it's
been a highly successful and important publication.
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He's a fellow of the Academy of Arts and Sciences and
the recipient of honorary doctor of laws degrees from Notre
Dame in 1077 and the University of Detroit in 1982.
The fi,,d in which he teaches is Constitutional Law and
- Supreme Court; he teaches these not only at the law
shool but also to the undergraduates at the University of Chicago and he's much in demand for lectures with the bicentennial year.
Phil, we're deeply honored to have you come to Washington to speak on behalf of the life members, and as you rise, I
present you with a certificate attesting to your loyalty to this
organizption. The other members of your class of '61, I regret
to say, have to pick theirs up at the desk, but they are waiting
for you and they are all signed and in your respective names,
so, Phl, thank you very much and congratulations. Professor
Kurland. (Applause)
PROFESSOR PHILIP B. KURLAND: To those of you whom
I purport to represent, I apologize. I am grateful to President
Perkins both for what he has said and for what he has not
said.
It was a year ago last January that I was honored by the
American Bar Foundation for my legal publications. I was
sure then, as I am now, that it was the quantity rather than
the quality of my bibliography that qualified me for that
honor.
In accepting the award, I suggested that the law has been
plagued with an overabundance of writing, whether in the
form of law review articles, casebooks, textbooks, briefs, judicial opinions, and even "Tentative Drafts" from the American
Law Institute.
The creed of our profession seems to be never to use one
word where one hundred will suffice. I suggested to the Bar
Foundation that their next writing award be given to Jhat
person who encompassed an ideo in the smallest possible num-
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ber of words - the equivalent of E equals MC' - or better
yet, be given to him or her who abstained from writing at all.
The ubiquitous ALl must have been present at the occasi' i of my earlier remarks. For today I am being honored by
this opportunity for access to an ALl podium - although or
because - I hav. been a member for twenty-five years and
have never uttered a syllable - orally or in writing - in its

deliberations or publications. (Laughter)
In this regard perhaps I am untypical of a large part of our
membership. Nevertheless, I accept this honor, not only for myself, but for all those similarly situated. I do not wish to imply,
however, that anyone other than myself is responsible fr any
discourtesy or astringency my words may fail to conceal.
When President Perkins called me to accept this honor,
his instructions were pellucid. "Your remarks," he said, "need
be neither substantive nor witty. The only requirement is that
they be short:' (Laughter)
On hearing this, it was as if a veil had been removed
from my eyes. Now I had the key to understanding the
speeches of all those who had occupied the lecterns of the ALl
for the pest quarter century. Indeed, I had the feeling that Mr.
Perkins' admonition may also havf been the guide issued to
the Reporters by the council for all, these years, however little
it may have been followed by them.
Let me quickly explain that it is not as easy as it may
seem to speak, even for a short time, and to abjure all wit and
substance, that is, to engage in what my mentor Thomas Reed
Powell disdained as "mere recitativo:'
The next best thing to saying nothing, however, is to say
the same things over again. What follows then falls somewhere between speaking in tongues and speaking in cliches,
and I have chosen a topic that especially lends itself to such
accomplishment: The Supreme Court of the United States.
The current call for a return to the meaning intended by
those who wrote the words of the Constitution is not novel.
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The phrase "original meaning" has simply replaced "strict
construction" as the rallying cry for those who want a revamping of constitutional law to bring it into closer conformity to their own political philosophy. The "strict constructionists" of twenty years ago meant strict construction, but only
some of the time.
For example, I never heard them argue that corporations
were not protected by the Due Process Clauses because they
were not really "persons." So, too, I doubt that today's "original intent" school would restrict the protections of the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to blacks forwhose sole
benefit those provisions were clearly intended by its authors.
Throughout American history, at least since the adoption
of ',ie 1787 Constitution, one or both of the political branches
of government have often been in fundamental disagreement
with the judicial branch over the propriety of the exercise of
the power of judicial review.
The frustrations of the first two branches, whose members come and go every two, four, or six years are aggravated
by the life tenure awarded to the Justices of the Supreme
Court for the very purpose of protecting the judges from the
political machinations of the elected branches.
In our 198-year constitutional history, we have had only
103 Justices. The average tenure of office has been about
twelve years, but every Court since Marshall's has included
one or more twenty-year veterans. Perhaps it should be noted
that the language of independence that was chosen - tenure
"during good behavior" - would certainly be found by a
strict constructionist not to mean unconditional life tenure.
An historian could readily show the phrase was derived
from an English statute pursuant to which English judges remained removable by petition of both houses of Parliament,
among other devices. But ever since Jefferson tried the impeachment route with Mr. Justice Samuel Chse and failed,
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the politica)l branches have been reduced to fulminating
against the Court while awaiting the use of the appointment
process to cure the evils that it perpetrates.
The behavior of the legislative and executive branches
over time in trying to curb the Court may be described as
volcanic. These mountains constantly rumble, but break forth
in strong attacks only periodically and usually after a case or
series of case- triggers the eruption. Then the Court's attackers
or detractors ielf-righteously wrap themselves in the Constitution and seek popular support by taking to the hustings or
stating their case through the media.
The formula was stated by Professor Felix Frankfurter in
a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt dated 27 December
1938, where he made some suggestions for improvement of
the presidential text.
Frankfurter wrote: "Be good enough to consider the suggestions in the light of their aim - to say everything that you
have said to educate the laity, and in the words of my great
master Holmes, 'calculated to give the brethren pain', but at
the same time give the scavenger profession nothing to feed
on. I idso should suggest that throughout you should appear as
the real guardian of the Constitution, adequate to the needs of
the nation if only judges would be obedient to the majestic
powers of the Constitution"
One advantage of such form of attack on the Court was
that generally the enemy did not shoot back. The Justices
themselves oidinarily adhered to their implicit vow of silence
not to speak about their functions except in the course of rendering opinions So the arguments on their behalf had to be
made through surrogates.
John Marshall's defense in McCuftoch v. Maryland aside,
until recent years Justices did not usually reply to the attacks
on the Court or its product. Lately, through law school
speeches and law review articles, particularly in talks at annual bar meetings, the Justices too have entered the fray, hut
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they never lacked for apologists and defenders both in the
ranks of the press and in academia.
Constitutional construction, like statutory construction,
has always invoked both more and less than the words of the
text. The intent of the authors, assuming it can be ascertained,
his never been the exclusive tool for construction. Certainly
the Constitution is the foundation on which constitutional law
is built; but constitutional law and the Constitution are not
the same.
The very few thousand words that the fundamental document contains are not adequate to resolve the myriad of legal
issues calling for a resolution by judicial action. Constitutional
law consists not only of the text but of fundamental-principles
inherent in that document. It includes as well its aspirations
for a representative government assuring majority rule while
protecting minority rights. Thus, constitutional law consists of
constitutional principles and of constitutional precedents, of
pressures of the needs for practical answers to practical problems, and, to varying degrees, even of the personal predilections of the possessors of power who sit in the Marble Palace at
the very apex of Capitol Hill in this city; they purport to earn
their living by the exercise of judgment.
Constitutional law is also politics, in the best sense of the
word, when it means establishing the governing legal principies. Alas, at times, coristitutional law also means politics in
the lowest sense of the word, a partisanship reflecting the interests of what Madison disdained as factions. Constitutional
law is a rule of decision; the Constitution is a frame of government.
The basic function of the Supreme Court has been and
ought to be the maintenance of the rule 0 law in our society:
The rejection of arbitrariness of governmental action; the prevention of agglomeration of power in any governmental function, area, or institution; the avoidance of the kind of
"corruption of the Constitution" that called forth the American Revolution. The constitutional demand for reasoned and
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justifiable assertions of authority by government is not to be
found in any particular words of the Constitution, but in that
rule of law which is a principle immanent in its creation.
The Court's deficiency is largely to be seen in its persistent and re arrent failure to apply the demands to itself tha. it
purports to apply to other branches of government. it is a
failure to recognize that its principal role is a judicial one, that
is, the resolution of a particular case or controversy on the
basis of the facts adduced. It is supposed to decide cases on the
basis of pre-existing law where possible, resorting to lawmaking only out of necessity, that is, where there are not existing
rules o- where the existing rules are patently and demonstrably redundant. It is not supposed to be a legislature establishing general rules of behavior for the people of this nation.
Eve, less is it supposed to be issuing a new Decalogue or another Sermon on the Mount. It is supposed to be a judicial
body determining, according to law, whether A is to prevail
over B, or vice versa, in a particular litigation. And in resolving that controversy, it is supposed-to state cogent reasons for
its conclusions. Those reasons may, indeed, be based on constitutional principles or text, on precedents, even on pragmatic
considerations and personal predilections. Those reasons
ought to be stated in its opinion, not only cogently, but fully
and openly and honestly.
The Court ought not to be a huckster of causes or a tgreat
communicator." When it fails in its capacity to persuade
rather than to command - the distinction is drawn by Mr.
Justice Brandeis - it fails its commitments to the maintenance of the rules of law which is its central constitutional
obligation. And the remedy is not for it to shift from espousing
one set of political creeds in order to embrace another, to shill
for one political platform rather than a second or a third one.
Perhaps these remarks are the maunderings of one academic lawyer which can be of no interest to the real world of
law and government. Certainly, they seem to have no appeal
to most of my academic colleagues who, like the Justices of the
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Supreme Court and the Attorney General, have seen "the
Truth" and are prepared to share it or impose it on those not
equally blessed. But I think that I ask for very little when I ask
that the Court confine itself to its function and say only what
it means and mean only what it says. Nor do I suggest that
such behavior is easy of accomplishment. I do think that it
would prove a better endeavor than chasing the will-o'-the
wisp of "original intention" as the Attorney General would
have us do, or than becoming the transmitter of the public
will, as Mr. Justice Brennan has publicly suggested.
For my two propositions-about the inadequacy of the arguments from original intention and the common will, I
woui -voke the highest authority in my own pantheon of
judicial gods and one whose voice should ring with particular
resonance in the domain of the American Law Institute,
Judge Learned Hand.
Of history as a guide to constitutional meaning, he said
many things. I offer some of his words to you now, asking that
you take particular care to notice that he did not deem history
irrelevant, simply inadequate.
Thus he once wrote: "American constitutions not only
distribute powers of government, but they assume to lay down
general principles to insure the just exercise of those powers.
This is the contribution to political science of which we are
proud, and especially of a judiciary of vestal unapproachability which shall always tend the Sacred Flame of Justice. Here
history is only a feeble light, for these rubrics were meant to
answer future problems unimagined and unmanageable.
Nothing which by the utmost liberality can be called interpretation describes the process by which they must be applied.
Indeed, if law be a command for specific conduct, they are
not law at all; they are cautionary warnings against the intemperance of faction and the first approaches of despotism:'
Again the good judge warned us, as far back as 1929, of
the error of "the notion that constitutional law is an expression
of a common will which immanently pervades and broods
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over a society, and is something higher and more authoritarian
than what would be found in any accredited source:'
"I think it can be demonstrated," he said, "that there's
nothing of the kind, if by common will we mean the assent of
men and women alive today. It was not made in that way
originally; no general recension has been accepted by any generation:'
In 1935, he added that the Founders did not mean by the
common will "what any individual, Whether or not he be a
judge, should think right and proper. They might have made
the judge the mouthpiece of the common will, finding it out
by his contacts with people generally; but then he would have
been a ruler, like the Judges of Israel:'
Hence, the lesson is if there were such a thing as a Rosseauan "general will" there is no reason to believe that its
terms and conditions are pecul'-rly discernible by the nine
Justices of the Supreme Court, or a majority of them.
Neither "original intent" nor "strict construction" nor judicial instinct for discovery of the "common will" is an adequate key to constitutional construction. Judicial review
essentially invokes a process of reasoned deliberation and explication, equally free of ideology and cant, and, to invoke
Judge hand just once more:
"Of course, you must have impartiality. What do I mean
by impartiality? I mean you mustn't introduce yourself, your
own preconceived notions about what is right. You must try,
as far as you can, it is impossible to human beings to do so
absolutely, but just so far as you can, not to interject your own
personal interests, even your own preconceived assumptions
and beliefs."
I've come to the end of my diatribe. Of the three prescriptions for my talk laid down by President Perkins, I submit
that ! have fulfilled two: affording neither substance nor wit.
If I' , overstayed my time, I apologize both to him and to
you. Thank you. (Applause)
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PRESIDENT PERKINS: Thank you so much, Phil. I don't
remember writing those suggestions or injunctions for the
framework of your talk, but if I did I will use them again
because they produced a honey.
So, thank you very much, and your voice is needed in the
Institute, so please let us not be so reticent in the next twentyfive years.
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